声明 ：在对科学的兴趣，这篇文章包含色情材料。 如果你是未成年人及/或敏感的人，建议你不要向下滚动。 如果你不读中国，这是确定的。

这是延续以前的文章系列中，我们结束了漫无边际的主要议题，并成为一个政治术语的羹。 今天，我回来了施加一些纪律。 文章的意思是什么性别，性，我们将尽。 只要坚持围绕理论的几个段落，或向右滚动的例子，如果你喜欢。

我们认为最后一次的问题是：为什么共产主义政权，其中大部分已经废除了宗教在某些时候，其实是最清教徒国家有关色情？ 可另行制定：为什么中国党员这么假正经呢？ 与色情日益增长的冲动审查机 ，这可能成为一个了解现代中国的根本问题 。 点击继续»

它看起来像查尔斯在新中国的鸿沟博客已经找到了新源，以振兴中国博客现场点击：辩论在中国在打击色情活动 。

虽然我通常不支持任何类型的检查，我不得不说我不关心的色情事业在中国。 从我所看到的，性别的小贩是最可耻的，垃圾邮件，病毒缠身，一般无用的互联网网站，分散他们的注意力从更重要的事情做喜欢读我的博客的网民。 你可以确信，你不会找到我在示威者的行列时，这些网站获得禁止。

然而，有一个禁止色情更重要的问题，这是中国当局的定义比我们通常理解为色情去的方式进一步。 它适用于一些精彩的 ​​艺术作品，包括电影，如李安的色戒和注意，或者这个伟大的电视连续剧 ，由柳书。 它是用来像一些优秀的艺术家唐炜边缘化，在一般情况下，有助于进一步扼杀创造力的中国文学和艺术的场景。

是肯定，多次禁止“不健康”的内容，只是一个借口摆脱持不同政见者或保护主义政策辩护。 但一般来说，当中国当局打击色情行动，它是一个真正的道德关注。 这里是在那里我看到一个更有趣的角度来讨论，将这个问题我问去年在有关职位的电视连续剧和共产主义道德的党员：为什么这么假正经呢？

从我的生活在不同的共产主义和前共产主义国家的经验，我认为这是不是严格意义上的中国现象。 事实上，它甚至不是一个共产主义的现象，而是一个处处保守的人的共同特点。 我维持，为什么在中国被禁止色情内容的原因仅仅是，中国共产党是一个极端保守的组织，并为所有的保守派，到处都厌恶性的公共显示，即使在私下，他们可能会觉得没有去妓院的5倍一个星期。

那么，为什么不保守派往往共同对性有特别的态度吗？ ，特别是为什么共产主义政权，废除所有宗教，性别相关清教的前列？

红保守党

首先，我想在这里补充一个保守派的定义，只是为了避免周围有一个词的含义，整个讨论反过来。 像大多数政治方面，这可以在不同地方有不同的含义。 我使用这个职位的意义是，我认为是最直观，最了解国际。 从大英百科全书 ：

表示偏好机构和历史发展的做法和政治态度或思想的连续性和稳定性的表现。 在当今时代，这是第一次表示，通过工程埃德蒙·伯克在法国大革命的反应，其中伯克认为其暴行玷污通过其理想。 保守派认为，实施的变化应该是最小的和渐进的，他们欣赏的历史，是较理想的现实。

在像中国这样的共产主义国家的情况下，它总是复杂，使用正常的政治方面的保守/逐行，或右/左。 原因是，在1949-1978年期间的范式被改变，和老保守派被灭绝。 因此，从零创建一个“新国家”，因此，中国政治生活中，“机构和演变历史的做法”只能算在共产党的历史定义的目的。 在中国的保守派往往是共产主义。

这种现象是很难独特。 它遵循的革命运动无处不在获得主流电源的逻辑：他们的焦点突然转向，从“改变世界”，“维持现状”，通常采取保守心态控制。

这是根本没有必要解释这个已经在中国居住的任何人，但我有一些美国人仍然觉得奇怪，打电话给一个共产主义政权的“保守”的感觉。 如果你觉得这一切仅仅是智力多嘴，你缺少了点。 中共的支持者是真正保守的人，他 ​​们的行为， 完全按照你期望从一个保守的其他地方。

从我与一些在中国共产党的热血青年男子，我在朝鲜的互联网夜长聊天的谈话中，我有一个合理的理解：什么动作那些坚信“共产党人”，他们不喜欢的外国势力，他们重视荒谬的重要性国籍和种族，他们是反对任何听起来像旧观念的思想自由或质疑，他们喜欢传统的女孩，漂亮的老炮，谁不穿迷你短裙，或在公众场合说话太多，结婚;他们不喜欢同性恋的人，他们很快叫“妓女”，当一个女孩酷似许多男人做的行为。

悲剧的是，这些保守的人绝不会是能够连接与他们的同行在美国，因为双方都仍然由他们自己的宗教和冷战rethoric的约束。 应该有人发明党的口号，如：世界的保守党，团结起来！

政治术语汤

我将不得不削减今天在这里，因为我的新博客政策不要让我做平均每个职位超过1000字。 我们将继续在未来的一，但在我结束之前，我想提的非常有趣的问题，在中国的政治术语。

由于上述范例的逆转，仍是一个很好的协议在西方的英语单词，哪些应该被用来命名一个共产主义国家的不同意识形态的混乱。 我没有在中国政治的学者，但我在主体（包括学术著作，如看书维克多施明德 ），我得到的印象，不规范的条款。 唯一的书，我已经看到，尝试做一个分类是小手册：“ 什么是中国认为 “由马克·伦纳德。

我希望有人会借给我一只手，并指出我的一些其他资源，在那里我可以看一下这件事。 在此期间，从我记得那本书和我的主动，主教派去如下：

老左： ​​在CPP要恢复毛泽东思想的强硬派。 西方相反，这些左撇子其实都是很保守的人。

老右：崇拜者和台湾的国民党，今天在大陆几乎看不见。 我从来没有见过的人，所以不知道他们是保守的字符或不。 我以为FLG许多成员将响应描述。

新左派：温家宝总理，推动更多的社会政策，公平分配的财富，等在共产党的统治，这样的政治家。 的心态仍是保守的，但小于老左派。

新右派政治家，思想家和一些企业在邓小平的启发鲨鱼“先富起来”，要优先沿海地区，并建立一个无情的资本主义制度。 他们不会有任何的心态，因为他们太忙先富，他们只要不关心政治思想作为自己的猫抓老鼠。

右左：这是我自己不正常的术语包括许志永或刘晓波等人，以及一些人士呼吁政治改革，民主权利和公民权利在中共。 其中许多是不是持不同政见者，但只是勇敢的党员敢于提出自己的声音。 这是唯一的想法，我有“进步”的心态回应。

你觉得这个术语呢？

注：此清单并不意味着可以作为参考，而是邀请参与，请提出你想要的任何条款，或指出我好读一些有关现代中国的政治。 对于那些来到这里找到一些性别，请明天再来时，我将继续与主体后，我会重视中国的色情图片。 有一个愉快的一天。

圣诞快乐大家。 伤心圣诞节对于中国来说，我们都爱这个国家，相信在自由，尊严和真理的人。

整整一年前，在圣诞节那天，我发表这篇文章关于刘宪章。 我是主动的关键原因是多方面的：它包含的矛盾，它是被动的，而不是主动，这不是一个以团结所有中国人的“宪章”。 但最重要的是，该文件的起草方式，确保它没有飞翔的机会。

这一举措实际上出生时死了，“联合国宪章”，甚至从来没有在09年初在中国的大课题，这是我们当时看了危机和刺激。 党已经从一开始就赢得了比赛，所以什么时候欺负刘现在，一年后呢？ 显然，只是为了树立一个榜样，以确保将关闭，其余的签名，并避免在未来几年内的新举措。 “杀了鸡来吓唬猴子”，中国传统的说。 ，这是不正义的，但一个恶心的黑手党技巧。

即使你不相信中国在民主，即使你认为（像我这样做），西方的虚伪政府给这里甚至没有教训，如果“宪章”可能不是最好的方式来实现的崇高原则它宣称。 即便如此，任何正派的人可以看到这样的文件不应该是一个被剥夺了自由人的一个原因。

党知道这一点，这是再次审查，趴在互联网上，从中国人民隐瞒其卑鄙。

现在这个故事已经拿起了CNN，它使一些噪音。 如果我们很幸运，这远远不够，甚至奥巴马可能会给我们一个难忘的线。 但它不会改变任何东西，因为这一切都是与中国打交道的一部分。 和句子是没有更多或更少比什么可以预计中国政府今天。

刘知道这口井，他决定去，尽管它。 那是因为他是一个理想主义者和英雄。 他将记住。

在这种情况下， 在这里 。 此外，从我自己的博客： 在这里 ， 在 这里和这里 。

这些原则，在中国于2008年出版的303勇士们：

自由 ，自由是普世价值的核心。 言论自由，新闻自由，集会自由，结社自由，在那里生活的自由，罢工，示威，抗议，其中包括自由，自由需要的形式。 没有自由，中国将始终保持远离文明的理想。

不是由一个国家赋予的人权。人权。 每个人与生俱来的尊严和自由的固有权利。 政府为保护其公民的人权存在。 由人民行使国家权力必须被授权。 在中国近代历史的政治灾害的继承是一个政权无视人权的直接后果。

平等。正直，尊严和自由，每个人，不论社会地位，职业，性别，经济状况，种族，肤色，宗教或政治信仰是任何其他的相同。 面前人人平等的法律和社会，经济，文化，公民和政治权利平等的原则必须坚持。

共和，共和，认为权力应政府和利益争夺的不同分支之间的平衡，应送达类似于中国传统的政治理想“在所有的公平性下天堂。”，它允许不同的利益群体和社会的集会，并与人各种各样的文化和信仰，行使民主自治和审议，以达到政府和自由和公平竞争的平等机会的基础上和平解决公共问题。

民主，民主，最根本的原则是人民主权和人民选择自己的政府。 民主具有以下特点：（1）政治权力开始与人民政权的合法性来源于人民。 （2）政治权力的行使通过人作出的选择。 （3）各级政府主要官员职位的持有人有决心通过定期的竞争性选举。 （4）尊重多数人的意志的同时，基本尊严，自由，人权和少数民族的保护。 总之，民主使政府成为一个现代化的手段“的人，由人民，为人民。”

宪政。宪政是通过法律制度和法律法规的实施，是宪法规定的原则规则。 这意味着自由和公民权利的保护，限制和界定合法政府的权力范围，并提供必要为这些目的的行政机构。

我已经意识到最近，由于在我培训的某些不平衡的方法 ，我的中文阅读能力可能会跑在前面，我的发言，我已经被迫采取严厉的纠正措施。 在风险变成一个SM的博客，我今天发言可怕的忏悔，我对自己的规定，以使该错误。 振奋自己：我看了整个22小时的共产主义电视连续剧在央视所有在一个星期停下来了解每一个字，成渝，。

这是最新的“红军反对资本家”，一种称为超生产冷箭 ，或“在背后捅刀子”。 第一章推出60周年的日子，在中央电视台黄金时间，证明它诞生大。 即使没有辜负人们的期望（切换后央视8晚），我猜测，更多的人都看着比“共和国基金会”的电影，太激动了西方思想。 不可否认的是，有关于冷箭的互联网上的小嗡嗡声，但那仅仅是因为目标受众是不同的（和更大）比互联网社区组。 与出租车司机自己的调查表明，它有一个非常强大的，至少在第一周以下。

对于那些抱怨政治宣传“共和国基金会”（或在独立日，为此事），这些都只是业余的努力下这个“背后捅刀子”。 因为刺是不关心，歪曲事实，但有启发性和提供了一个完整的人的道德体系。 和最喜欢这些受到广泛关注的中国电视连续剧，它仍沿用第一说教了由20世纪30年代在陕西游击队组织的精神，在忠实。

一点点批判

艺术性方面，我将只简单地说，虽然这看起来像最高的预算“红军”系列之一，迄今为止，在提高质量不遵循。 主要问题是可见其生产者和演员几乎无一例外的无能。 知道中国有很好的能够做好电影时，给他们一定的自由，我只能假设这是死官僚选择由央视木乃伊的干部培养想象力的结果。

在这种情况下，主要的故事是关于-惊喜的对西方的长征 ，船长发现有一个资本主义的敌人间谍渗透的团队。 事实上，并非只有一个，而是两个，三个，多被发现在每一个章节，直到串行年底由大队大的部分其实是卧底。 这使贫困边缘黄丁志忠无数次的队长起到戏剧性的偏执，显然是一个主要的卖点，配合运行。 人们不禁要问，为什么所有这些间谍不只是得到一起杀死他们的滑稽的队长，他们大队与国民党明星命名，并得到他们的反革命业务。

如果你已经经历过看电影时，我不知道，但它是可悲的脚本和性能管理杀暂停怀疑的权利，从第一个序列的实例之一。 然后，突然，你发现自己看着一群成年的人，有趣的衣服走动发出毫无意义的废话。 结果是尴尬。

我从来没有去过许多电视观察家，但我不明白，是不合标准的电视电影在世界任何地方，和荒谬情节或braindead对话的绝不是中国的独家。 甚至与固定红军进军西部的事迹不一定是荒谬的，也就是说，比文盲牛牧民在固定的西部片的黄金时代。 但目前在这些中国的连续剧，使他们超越了明显的宣传和质量问题的独特的东西，这是一套完整的价值观，他们体现了人民群众的熏陶。

有启发性的群众：共产党问答

这是第一次（和最肯定是最后一次），我看一个完整的中国宣传串行，但我相信，努力没有白费。 因为只在这些长期工程，人们可以欣赏，更深层次的流量下，建设一个公共的道德体系，是非常类似于宗教教育 。

这里有几个点，我注意到那些想了解这些作品，不漏扔下22小时以上，他们的生活福利，边看刺：

• 爱：爱的场面是俗气的，nauseate一个装甲旅，也许是最好的例子，在40分钟第4章，当队长“爱上” 现场 。 在一般情况下，共产党人之间的爱情是贞洁和清白的，并始终中学组织的利益。 没有丝毫的浪漫放纵，没有激情党以外的让步。 当共产主义的爱人告诉记者，她心爱的是资本主义的间谍，她当场就放弃了他，和志愿者如有必要，要杀死他。

• 性别：当然，这不停止清教有正确的性教育（下表）开始第25章中作者明确的努力，以吸引更多的观众，年轻的中尉。 “乱搞男女关系！”（无序做男人，女人的关系！！）纯洁惊叹队长时，他得到的消息，通过令人作呕的良性举报人。 但不担心，道德的纯洁性保障。 These two sinners have betrayed the higher cause, and they receive their deserved punishment without further delay: death at the hands of some brigands.

• Violence: We have seen enough of the likes of Eastwood in Alcatraz to have some expectations about the frightful fate of new prison inmates (especially if they are male!). I don't know to what extent this violence is consistent with reality, but what I am pretty sure is that prison wardens do not tell off the inmates screaming “don't be naughty”, and major disputes in the common cells are not settled through pillow fights. This is exactly how things are done in 冷箭, making the whole experience for the high level KMT prisoners like a children's Summer Camp. This is one of the most puzzling parts of the communist ethics, and the most difficult to grasp in a movement that was imposed largely through violent revolution. It seems to come from a belief in molding mentalities through peaceful labour, but, as we will see below, it has little to do with the Christian notion of “turning your other cheek”.

• Class virtue: Virtue is presented as a characteristic of the proletarian class, and salvation must necessarily follow. Like the ancient Christians looking for consolation in the Bible before they were thrown to the lions, so the Chinese Laobaixing today seem to find solace in these serials, while they wait for the next corrupt CCP cadre to come and tear their homes to serve a rich developer. The notion of a Final Judgment that accompanies this kind of teaching is represented through the iconic verses of the Internationale, sung at several points in the serial, with the main theme conspicuously inspired in the melody of the first verse.

• 宽恕与报复：有一个令人震惊的一幕 （CH 31 38:00）复仇的主要间谍被逮捕时，醇厚流血和谐20小时后，我彻底惊呆了。 义的人员打击是完全没有怜悯，享受原始的复仇快感。 我对中国的观察，这很好地代表他们的道德体系的悖论：中国本质上是远远超过西方任何人宽容，但也许作为一个必要的后果 - 一旦达到一定程度的犯罪，这台该对象不再被视为人类的无情惩罚机制。 这也许是我们少宽容天性被软化的新约的爱学说与基督教影响的道德，最重要的区别。 在中国与欧洲的D 希思罚款的整个讨论是一个有趣的这种差异在展望现代发展。

一些结论

这里值得评论的许多想法进一步，也许是最有趣的之一将是如何这个道德共产主义制度是工作（或失败）保持总是微妙的平衡与道德（美德）和邓小平的致富（致富） 。

显然，中国人是不是唯一的道德引入到他们的电视连续剧。 西方流行的连续剧已长期被教育与教导我们尊重少数，容忍同性恋，爱国主义或民主变化。 但重要的是，虽然西方道德教育体系的演变与当今社会面临的问题与时并进，交易，中国的制度一直停留在20世纪30年代，与宗教伦理的特点刚性。 因此，有一个不断增长，在中国鼓吹的思想和普通市民的实际需要之间难以逾越的鸿沟。 这可以消除所有来自中国大陆的生活道德的灾难性的影响。

当我们认为种族主义，腐败，缺乏尊重的公共物品或环境，多少这些都与缺乏一个现实的，最新的道义上的支持等问题发言，或劫持的职业道德，服务中共的权力精英的单一的利益吗？

我想对此说，但不幸的是，这个职位已经失控，我知道没有人读过去的第一个1000字。 以下任何特定点，并写下你的想法，如果我们得到了一些有趣的讨论，我们可以尝试，扩大后的新主体。

现在，我是在一个自由的互联网国家，我的机会来看看CDT的网站，我发现这个有趣的问题，从人贾兹拉：如果失去了毛，会发生什么？

我不是在对反事实历史的原则，它可以在很多情况下是有用的，从不同的角度看到的事件。 这也使得热闹的酒吧交谈和博客评论。 但这种运动意义的基本条件是，在我看来，连锁分析事件有任何实际发生的机会。

For example: it might be interesting to imagine how the world would have been if Hitler was killed in the 1944 assassination attempt, or what would have happened if Mao died before the Great Leap Forward. In a similar way to an experiment in physics, by isolating later factors, we try to analyze the effects of their policies up to that point. But there is little interest in analyzing the outcome of impossible or even absurd events, other than for humorous purposes. What if Hitler had suddenly become a pacifist in 1941?

Back to the point: “What if Mao had lost?” This question treats the defeat of Jiang Jie Shi as a mere accident of history, a question of luck in which the outcome, like Hitler and the bomb, could have been decided by fluke.

But the defeat (or rather the retreat) of Jiang was not the outcome of a single battle. People asking this question forget that Jiang had the power for many years, with all the instruments of the State, the largest part of the population and territory under his control, and military and economic aid from other countries. For years, all the odds were on his side. The opportunity implied in the question “what if Mao had lost?” was already given to Jiang. And the best answer to the question is:

If Mao had lost, Jiang lost anyway

There were profound reasons that made Jiang's system impossible. His ideology–or lack thereof–was not appealing enough at a moment when China needed a catalyzer for all its unleashed energy. Something was needed to rally the people against the oppression of the foreigners and of the local tyrants, and Jiang was not delivering in any of the two fronts. China needed something to believe in. If Mao hadn't been there, another leader would have sold the idea, or other worse ideas , and who knows the frightful regime that might have resulted.

This failure of Jiang to inspire, together with the corruption inherent to his regime, condemned him to impose power by raw force. A scheme that worked well when he moved over to Taiwan with supporters and soldiers in large number relative to the local population, but it simply could not have worked in mainland China. It would have required a level of organized brutality that only a fanatic could accept.

So Mao won, and then what?

So back to reality: Mao won. He played his cards much better and he won by a mile. Then some years later he proved to be less gifted as a politician than as a revolutionary. Worse still–and this is really his worst sin–he fell in love with himself and with power, and he didn't have the good sense to listen to capable advisers, nor the dignity to retire when he was still in time. The “70% good/30% bad” judgement passed by Deng was probably too generous, but inevitable: to condemn Mao was to condemn the work of his life. Deng could not do more than he did, and of those who came after him, not a single one had what it takes to even dare touch this question.

And here is, in my opinion, the heart of the matter: why is Mao still so present in the Chinese psychology? When are we going to move on? The Chairman is not just stuck on a wall, he is imprinted very deeply in the collective mind of the Chinese, and through compulsory education, propaganda and parades like last week's, he holds to his place and no amount of economic progress can sweep him away.

Here is an example of what I mean : Recently I lent the book “Mao: The Unknown Story” , by Chang Jung –a book that is very critical of Mao– to a Chinese friend. This friend is young, and liberal to the point that he believes Dalai Lama is a good man. And yet, when two weeks later I asked him about the book, I got a reaction that shocked me. “This woman is not really Chinese” , “You cannot understand”, were among the broken phrases that he grumbled. I know this book is surely not the most balanced biography of Mao, and I was open to accept many of his arguments. But I saw there was no point in discussing further, because somehow we had landed in the territory of hurt feelings.

But the interesting discussion today is not whether Mao was 70% right or 17.5%. The past is past, and there is no use in digging up the skeletons again, except for specialists in history. The key is the present, and the reason why Mao still holds his place should be searched in the leaders of today.

The answer is simple: Mao is there because he is still needed. No matter how terrible his failures and how cruel the consequences–and most Chinese know them well–Mao is still the only one that gives some ideological content to the system. He provides the meaning to the colourful parade of last week, and to the other parade of black suited mummies that is “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. And that is the reason why most Chinese are so quick to excuse him: “He was good man used by his wife”, they say, or “it was not his fault, he was senile”.

Ideals are important for a society to believe in itself. In the West we have democracy, human rights, religion, a whole range of them to suit all the sensibilities. As often as not, they are utilized by politicians for their own selfish goals and devoided of any real meaning. But at least they are ideals, and they give us the illusion that our struggle is worth fighting. I see people discussing Obama or Bush, and whatever the real effect of their policies might be, it is obvious that they give a meaning to politcs in America.

In China, on the contrary, the only ideal since Mao died has been Deng's “Get Rich”. Many theories have been published since, filling thick books with party rhetoric, but not a single one of them contained anything that the people could believe in, or even understand. Once and again, the actions of the party have shown that above any other consideration, the only important objective is GDP, and the maintenace of the status quo.

There is a serious lack of leadership in the communist party of China, partly due to the internal mechanisms of the party itself . Strictly materialistic objectives are quickly dissapointing, for those that achieve them as much as for those left behind, and the people naturally turn for inspiration to the only ideals available: nationalism and Mao. And so it happens that the old portrait cannot be taken down, because it is there to cover a hole. The black hole of Chinese politics.

I was pleasantly surprised when I booked my last minute flight to Japan, I got a very reasonable price for the 1st October National Day. When I went to Pudong airport I understood why: the streets were empty in Shanghai, nobody flew at that time because they were all at home with the eyes glued to the TV set, watching as thousands of men and women, looking silly in their flowery dresses, marched on Beijing's Chang An Avenue.

I had the chance to watch the parade for 30 minutes as I waited to board my plane. I have to say it was beautiful. Sure enough there were cringeworthy moments, like when the TV showed the communist model peasants, workers and miners , shining like Mario Bros in 256 colours. But of course, a good deal of hypocrisy is always mandatory in these State events, in China and elsewhere. And regarding the execution, I have watched quite a few of the famous mass events in Pyongyang, and I am pretty sure North Koreans are white with envy watching this one, if their state channel even cared to broadcast it.

All this display of patriotism reminded me of the conversation I had last week with little Yi. It was after we watched an advert on TV, the one where the little girl stands on Tiananmen Square squeaking in that ghastly toddler tone: “妈妈我爱你!” (mum, I love you), and a similar girl says the same in Tibetan in front of the Potala temple of Lhasa. The screen then goes white, and a message comes up: “祖国我爱你”. Motherland, I love you. I don't remember which was the company announced, but the advert has been showing continuously for months, and it was the eleventh time I watched it.

I had a delicate stomach that day, and pushed to the limits of resistance, I couldnt help bringing up the subject:

“This is ridiculous,” I said bluntly, “you can't love a country like you love your mother!”

“Of course you can,” said little Yi, “you don't understand the feelings of the Chinese!”

“Yeah, right.”

Babbling toddlers and feelings of the people. That was about as much as I could take before lunch. I regretted I'd spoken at all.

“Our country is like a mother for all the Chinese, ” she continued, “that is what they mean.”

“Yeah, OK, except that it is NOT the same. A mother gives you life, she will always love you and no matter what happens, no matter what mistakes you do or how stupid you behave, she will be there for you. A country, if you fail to comply, will just abandon you or even put you to death ”

“Well, it is a different kind of mother. If you fail, the punishment is terrible. If you work hard and succeed, the prize is much greater. It is a mighty mother with higher stakes, what is wrong with that?'

“Nothing wrong, just that that is not Love”

“It is,” she insisted. “Or don't Christians teach love of God, and isn't He much more terrible, that if you fail to behave even your life is not enough, and you get an eternity of pain?”

“I…,”

我闭嘴。 她有一些点。 特别是，我不相信基督教的上帝，此外，2000年前，他们发明了一种母亲玛丽正是为了对付旧约粗糙的边缘。 但它是真实的，在宗教和政治，在西方很多人都觉得作为中国人的感情爱的同类。 所以这是不是真的一本关于中国的讨论，但对爱国主义更普遍。

我的问题是，我不接受这个词是指一个国家的爱。 原因之一，只能人之间发生，有时可能与动物，但没有用的东西，一种感觉，因为我明白爱。 绝对不会像“国家”的抽象和简单的可操作的概念。 但理所当然的，这仅仅是一个语言的问题，我没有权力规定如何应使用“爱”字，更如何“爱”在中国就业。 尽管如此，对爱情有一个更引人注目的为祖国的论点：我认为这是在党的“爱”的最佳利益。

让我们来看看事实。 人类社会有某种方式，组织和权力需要被别人举行。 在过去，这是部落，皇帝或封建领主。 现在，它是民族国家，没有什么特别不妥。 所有形式的组织需要尊重公民工作和参与，它是在每个人的利益，相应地对待他们，一旦已经确立其合法性。 因此，我明白重要的是要尊重和改善国家的工作，我尝试这样做，就像我为我公司或我的大学。 但像母亲一样爱他们吗？

这可能是我从一个非常欧洲的角度来看，尽管绝不是主流，甚至有发言。 也许我没有考虑到像中国这样的国家的具体情况。 欧洲人使用的是傲慢和祖国最致命的恋人，直到他们过多的感情带来败坏和灭亡。 中国的爱国主义从来没有引起任何灾难甚至可以媲美幅度，而不是工作很好地保存来自外国强加的苦难人民。 因此，许多中国人的感情是可以理解的，如果不是今天不一定有利。

仍然，关键的问题，我们要问自己的是：这些感受在公民的利益，并在人类作为一个整体的利益呢？ 可以真正的世界和平，如果公民和他们的国家之间的关系是一种盲目的爱，像孩子的母亲吗？ 当有利益冲突，是可爱的孩子不会被迫打自己心爱的最后的后果吗？ 由于利益冲突和贪婪的统治者生活的事实，不会消失，是不矛盾的爱与世界和平的理想，我们最信奉的学说？

我想听到这个意见。 当然，据我所知，很多多愁善感的人，爱自己的国家的感觉是非常活跃的，有一点解释，因为它只是一种感觉。 但中国往往是非常合理的，并在控制自己的感情，当他们选择爱是很少盲目的激情，而是因为他们认为它是一个好的选择。 我怀疑他们的爱国主义是囚犯的两难境地 ：在大多数情况下，如果其他国家采取行动爱国，只有理性的态度是做同样的。

但我想，如果人们实际上是遵循这个逻辑（最终防守的态度），或者是真的那么爱自己的国家和他们的国旗，他们甚至不认为它。 如果你不想想，你真的相信一个和平的世界是可能的，在长期的吗？

也许我想太多有时。 也许我来自长崎，我刚才看到的人类造成的恐怖，最令人不寒而栗的展览之一，写的事实，可能有一些影响，今天我的想法。 仍然，我站在我写在这里。

你有什么意见？

（PS.就同一议题，也看到这篇文章只是上发表Chinageeks的 ）

关于中国种族主义的讨论不断回来而在每一次，每次都引起强烈的激情。 这是后，我一直在想，做了一段时间之后，我们在三月有趣的评论，作为新疆系列的结论。

引发这次辩论的故事是， 娄婧 ，是中国在电视选秀节目的一半黑色的参加者已经在互联网上的种族主义言论的对象。 我不认为这本身就是重要的，各国的网民都众所周知张贴离谱的意见，在现实生活中，他们永远不会说出的。 但撇开，很明显是有特定的姿态在中国种族，冲击在许多西方国家，并承担一些反映。

因为它不只是不成熟的网民，同时也支持像笑话的名字和姓氏的尊敬的人，或写这样的评论。 当然，在许多情况下，我们所看到的仅仅是一个内脏反应来自西方的指责。 具有讽刺意味的​​是，许多中国人认为，即使是在一个中国一贯表现比他们更好的领域，傲慢的，居高临下的西方人仍然觉得有道理公共教训给他们一定恼人。

但双方通过第一波激烈的意见后，这是值得冷静看待事物，看到这些误解背后的现实是什么。 和现实的情况是，它是在中国太常见了，听到这样的语句，为“维吾尔人的危险”或“非洲人不聪明”，甚至，令人惊讶的是，“白人比亚洲更能干”。 所有这些西方耳相当惊人的意见，但中国从未归咎于种族主义。

事实上，大多数似乎遵循一个简单的逻辑：“在中国没有问题，因为不像西方人来说，中国人不是种族主义者”。 这种想法显然是，大多数中国人没有经验，由宣传部门制作的工作室，材料，许多国家都面带微笑五颜六色的服装的儿童比其他不同种族的事实。 和它背后的是“人民联盟”从共产主义学说的继承，仍然可能会被视为该国的中心：

毛泽东：“对于世界各国人民的联盟，欢呼”

我并非暗示共产主义理想，这是没有诚意的。 它是，它可能仍然是许多人。 问题是，而几十年前这肯定是在宽容和尊重的先锋队，在当今全球化的世界，它只是不剪​​了。

Because sure enough, the Chinese are right to say that it is not for Westerners to dictate acceptable racial attitudes. But neither is this a prerogative of the Han. Ultimately it is the peoples that feel discriminated, be it Africans or Uyghurs, who should have a major say. For in any dispute, it is not the offending, but the offended party who decides (within some reasonable limits) what words or attitudes are insulting.

Ultimately, the development of new racial attitudes in China will have important consequences for the whole World, and in particular for its own national interests. The process is still in its initial steps, but already some key challenges are apparent: internally, as more minorities are questioning their treatment by the Han; and externally, as China tries to expand its influence in strategic regions like Africa and South America. All the soft power obtained in these areas will be worthless if the Chinese fail to show convincing respect to the peoples living there.

And again, is China racist?

So is there really a problem, and if so, what can be done to solve it? As some Chinese would have it: Is it wrong just because we say that Asians are better at math and black Americans better at basketball? In other words, is China racist?

From my own observation, China is in essence no more racist than most other countries. Which is to say, very much indeed. Because that is how most of the World is today, and how it has always been. If there is a notable difference between China and the West, it is just one of appearance: we are better at hiding our prejudice.

Indeed, in the West we censor ourselves to a point that it is hardly even acceptable to ask questions like the one in italics, which boils down to: “Do different races have on average different sets of skills?” The non-prudish answer to this is obviously yes, as can be learned from simple observation. Different races, just like different genders, tend to have slightly different characteristics, and this diversity has never been a problem for honest, open minded people, but rather the opposite.

The problem comes when obtuse individuals choose to focus partially on these differences, and then theorize them in a way as to satisfiy some low psychological needs. And at times such individuals have even convinced enough people to be able to rule their country, invariably leading it to ruin and to shame. From old Sparta to imperial Japan, history shows that short-sighted ideas of ethnic purity do not yield best results, groups based on those premises consistently falling behind the creative power of diverse societies.

So, knowing that in every country the obtuse are legion, what has the West done to prevent those outbreaks which oppose diversity and “brought untold sorrow to mankind”? Recognizing that human stupidity knows no bounds and cannot be eliminated, Western societies have instead learnt to sweep it under the carpet. And in an amazingly short period of time, in the second half of the XX century, they have developed a series of norms to regulate speech, enforcing them through the power of the socially acceptable. This non-written code, derisively known as PC, ensures that individuals can remain as prejudiced as ever, but will refrain from making it public, or else face social exclusion.

In the meantime, China's insular society has never really felt up to now the need to develop these restraints, and so its racial prejudice is able to run free in conversation, shocking the sensitive ears of the occasional foreigner, and earning little goodwill from the peoples they are supposed to befriend.

Should China follow the West?

There is a natural resistance from the Chinese to adopt any kind of PC solution, mostly because they don't feel the problems described apply to them: in the history of racist madness, they were mostly on the receiving end. And it is fair to say that, as a people, Chinese have always been one of the most tolerant, accepting different religions and cultures at a time when their counterparts in the West were already going berserk to eliminate the infidel. Why would such a civilized society need to apply the same rigid standards of restraint as the wild West?

It should not, in my opinion, and China is right to ignore upfront many of the Western over-reactions. In a healthy community there is nothing essentially wrong with calling a black “black” or a yellow “yellow”, like Chinese and other peoples do. The complex, guilt-ridden American style PC is best suited for the conditions of that particular country, and should not be forced onto the Chinese.

But this is not to say that the system should not be improved. From my observation of some of the affected communities in China, it looks like the present state of affairs is far from ideal. Chinese should work to modernize their rusty, communist era conceptions and little by little come up with a more realistic, more equal and less condescending racial attitude that will be key for the success of the coming challenges, internal and external. And the State alone cannot undertake this modernization. Like in the West, it is society at large, with its authors, and celebrities, and other public role models that should join in the effort.

Chinese have a golden opportunity now to build their racial attitudes starting almost from scratch, from intelligence and generosity rather than from guilt, and to regain the image of tolerance and good sense in international relations that their country has deserved.

One of the essential purposes of a government is to ensure the safety of the citizens and, from this point of view, the Chinese government has failed spectacularly in Urumqi.

To begin with, it did not afford sufficient protection to the Han victims during the night of 5th July. Some wrong decisions were most likely taken during the crisis, and the leaders of the forces of order owe at least some explanation to the Chinese.

But the CPC has failed in a more crucial way, which cannot be ascribed to simple human error in time of emergency. It has failed to create the conditions for the peaceful coexistence of the Chinese; it has failed in the very objective that it states as its own: the creation of a harmonious society . 200 Chinese killed by Chinese are the clear proof of this failure.

I will analyze in this post some of the reasons why the interethnic policies may have failed and what can be done to improve the situation. There are many good arguments both for and against the independence of Xinjiang, which would make for a fascinating discussion, but I will not touch the subject here. Whatever the theory says, the reality is that Xinjiang is and shall remain Chinese for the foreseeable future. Large numbers of both Han and Uyghur can equally call Xinjiang their homeland, and these peoples have to learn to live together for their own sake. Let's try to be constructive and see how this can be achieved.

The intentions of the CPC

I began by saying that the government has failed, which is obvious. But to be completely fair, interethnic relations is an extremely difficult area where almost every government in the World has failed to some degree. Looking at the region where Xinjiang sits, and comparing with interethnic and interreligious strife in similar nearby countries we have to acknowledge that the record of Xinjiang in the last 20 years is far from catastrophic.

Some argue that there are no worse problems –fundamentalism, suicide bombings, war- just because the Han are repressing the Uyghur population to inhuman extremes. This is easily proven wrong, and anyone who has been to the area knows this much. Moreover, a simple look at the World can tell us that even the most extreme repression by the army does not guarantee peace, but rather the opposite, as seen in Uzbekistan, Chechnya or Palestine. It is not mainly force, but prosperity and stability that have kept the Uyghurs silent.

The party's interethnic policies have failed, but the very existence of these policies and their actual enforcement speaks a lot for the nature of the CPC's intentions. The clear goal of the party is to guarantee China's unity, stability and harmony , it is not and has never been to impose the supremacy of the Han. Granted, China is an authoritarian regime, and individual rights are not always respected, in Xinjiang or in any other province. China needs democracy and rule of law, but this has nothing to do with the oppression of the Uyghur by the Han.

Interethnic policies

Let's take a look at the essential of these interethnic policies, which mostly come in the form of positive discrimination: 10 added points in the gaokao exams for access to university, partial exclusion from the single child policy, quotas (but rather low ) in the administration and, most surprising of all: an explicit policy of lenient treatment for non-political crimes, which is known to all Chinese in the form of the common assumption: “be careful with Uyghurs, they can carry knives”.

Another group of policies are the ones destined to avert the danger of Islamic fundamentalism. These include prohibition to wear headscarves and other religious attire in schools and government buildings, prohibition for under 18 year olds to attend prayers at the mosque, and strict control of the clergy. While we can accuse these policies of offending sensibilities, we might as well say that France has a similar headscarf prohibition, and that China is consistent with its clear principle of forbidding religions to engage in politics. An enlightened rule, in my opinion, more so in a place where there is reasonable grounds for fearing religious fundamentalism.

Other more recent policies, decided by the maximum leader of the party in the region, Wang Lequan , are less justifiable. In particular the one related to having all the schools teach solely in Mandarin makes no sense and can only spark resentment among the Uyghurs. The logic of this decision is that all citizens need to be proficient in mandarin, but this point is not technically sound, as it has been proven that a full bilingual education from early age is compatible with proficiency in two languages.

Grievances

One interesting point in the conflict of July and its aftermath is that it was never made clear what exactly the protesters wanted. The WUC had plenty of media time, but it didn't present a consistent program. Kadeer dedicated her appearances to send out casualty figures and to deny her role in the events, relating them to the Guangdong incident. As a result, it is difficult to know which of the Chinese policies are most resented by Uyghurs, other than being “colonized and repressed”. The absence of a moderate Uyghur voice makes things very difficult to understand, another consequence of the heavy handed government of Wang Lequan.

In any case, it looks like it is not so much a matter of one policy in particular, but a problem of attitudes between the Uyghurs and he Han. A problem of integration and mutual misunderstanding that is so typical of interethnic conflict in any Western country, rather than a conflict between the oppressors and the oppressed. This is consistent with many of the observations of foreigners living in Xinjiang.

Much has been written in the West about positive discrimination, and you might be familiar with the kind of problems it can create. There is a natural reaction of resentment in the poorest elements of the majority group at what they see as unjust favouritism towards minorities. But worst of all, policies such as “ 2 restraints, 1 leniency ” lend themselves to abuse and often benefit the worst individuals in the minority, starting a vicious circle of negative selection.

In China positive discrimination is particularly vicious because the Han, encouraged by the official media, tend to take these few concessions as a definitive proof of their generosity towards the Uyghurs, which then gives them carte blanche to engage in all sorts of discriminating behaviours, in many cases not even realizing that they are being unfair .

The Uyghurs react to this perceived –and often very real- discrimination by adopting the role of eternal victims and recalling the invasion of the bingtuans , or the dilution of their people, which is hardly a strong argument as: 1- A large part of the bingtuan population is not installed in Uyghur areas, 2- The Chinese have been doing bingtuan-like activities in Xinjiang long before the Uyghurs even arrived and 3- Chinese companies have all the right to establish in any areas of their country as long as they are not forcefully expropriating the original owners.

Some possible solutions

In conclusion, I think this is not so much a matter of bingtuan, oppression or ethnical dilution, but rather a matter of complete insensibility from both sides Han and Uygur, and most of all from the Chinese government in Xinjiang, whose head only cares about pleasing Beijing .

I know the really important problem – lack of democracy and rule of law – will not change in Urumqi until it does in Beijing. But without looking so far, I have some modest suggestions to the CPC of Xinjiang that should be easy to try and improve the situation. All relatively simple points, more gestures and attitudes than large power concessions:

• Don't forcefully modernize Kashgar declaring it backward .
• Don't force monolingual schools on people for their own benefit.
• Impose 100% bilingual schools for all in majority Uyghur areas.
• Stop, progressively and with tact, the leniency policies.
• Enforce the laws against discrimination in job postings .

But most important of all, I have one advice for the government of China that is not restricted only to Xinjiang: Actively promote mutual respect and understanding among different cultures and races.

This ability is seriously lacking in most Chinese of all ethnicities, as this essential part of their education has for years been substituted by clichéd touristic dances and children in costumes. This spells trouble for China not only with the minorities, but also in other regions where it wants to earn respect and expand its influence, like Africa or South America.

I was not there and I do not know more than what is in the press. But in the light of the available information, I think it's worth it to have another look at the events, and see what we make of it. Refer to the NYT diagram linked on the illustration, this paper is hardly suspect of pro-CPC, and the information included (from witness accounts) is about as detailed as has been published concerning the events of 5th May.

It all started with a protest in People's Square, followed by a concentration along Liberation Road, which was met around 6.30 by the People's Armed Police. Up to here everything is “normal” in the logic of street rioting: there were clashes and probably some victims from both sides. But Liberation Rd. is very central, many people live there and surely the NYT would have found at least a witness to mention it if hundreds of people had been killed or made prisoner at this point.

But it is afterwards, especially after 8, along the axes of Tuanjie and Dawan Roads, that the events are not normal by any standard of social disorder. Street riots, like other forms of violence, can have collateral damage, but this is not the case. The police was not there, the Han mobs couldn't have been organized in such a short time, and the only way to explain those deaths is that it was a deliberate large scale massacre of civilian residents and passers by. This is consistent with what was written in other accounts by various newspapers.

The initial count of 123* Han casualties that has been more or less accepted by all sides as minimum is an astonishing figure for actions that happened mostly in the space of 5 hours and in such a reduced area. Looking at other riots in the region, including Xinjiang, Tibet or other Chinese areas, we see this ratio is completely out of range. This was not the heat of the fight in a political riot. It was cold-blooded persecution, the kind of actions that can only be the work of fanatics.

Who was behind the events

In its August 2 issue, the Hong Kong newsweekly Yazhou Zhoukan interviewed Heyrat Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist, blogger, and AIDS activist, the kind of person who is unlikely to be partial to the CPC. Heyrat speaks about the Islamic Liberation Party, Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami, a pan-islamic international political party which is formally peaceful, but which has been accused in the past of inciting violence in Europe. This organization has spread very quickly in Xinjiang in the last decade.

As a witness in Urumqi, Niyaz notes the strong Kashgar accents of many of the protesters and the religious slogans that were heard in the protests. This brings to mind all the times the CPC has spoken of the menace of an Islamist group called ETIM, which might actually exist or not. In any case, some radical groups do exist, as was clearly seen from attacks like this one last year, where 16 policemen were coldly knifed and bombed after being run over.

I will not accuse any group without proof, as I would be guilty myself of the same “solid block” thinking I criticized yesterday. But what we have seen up to now should make any honest observer curious, and it certainly warrants further investigation in the field of radical islamism in Xinjiang. In a region bordered by countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is not at all unthinkable that frustrated youths take example of their counterparts across the border and find an escape in a perverted version of religion.

Response

The Chinese government has handled the crisis relatively well, given the circumstances. Actually, the main objection one could make is the opposite of what most Western readers like to imagine: on Sunday 5th more force should have been used to avoid the murders.

If you think of it, you might agree that the CPC leaders are not precisely idealistic dreamers. When they let the foreign reporters into a place it is because they know they have nothing to lose, and this time they must have been pretty confident that they were not to blame. Also we have to admit that, even when in front of journalists, it is unusual in most armies in the World to exhibit so much discipline and restraint as the Chinese did in the aftermath of indiscriminate racist attacks against their own people.

A large part of the Western media were confused by this attitude, which perhaps explains why they left so early. Indeed, it is some food for thought and it can make some weaker spirits shrink, to consider that for the second time in a row (after the Sichuan disaster) China proves that, sometimes, an authoritarian regime can do things better than a democracy. It takes some solid convictions and some understanding of ones own ideals to be able to look at the World without the mould of good and evil.

In any case, there is little doubt – the Western media has given me no reason to think otherwise – that the Chinese double approach of media control and moderate police action has produced the best results during the crisis. It goes without saying that this only works as a short term formula to curb down the violence, and that much more will need to be done from now on to really solve the problems in Xinjiang. More about long term solutions in the next posts.

Rebiya Kadeer

I will not waste time here to discredit Rebiya Kadeer, because from the beginning she discredits herself. She has provided no basis at all for most of the information she gave to the media, and some of her claims are so absurdly wrong that it actually makes me think she has to be innocent: someone who's made it in business can't possibly be such a bad liar. The only explanation is that she is totally clueless.

Click on the picture for one example of her latest claims.

More than anything, Kadeer gives the impression that she is desperate for TV time. She knows her time of fame is running to an end, and she is forced to place ever stronger claims, raising the stakes at each go to attract the tired audiences. As blogger twofish reflected, if she really cared about the future of Xinjiang, she might have grabbed this chance to send a message of peace and try to connect with the rest of the Chinese at a time when they were brutally attacked, earning perhaps the respect of the moderates.

But how has someone like Kadeer, a successful businesswoman in her time, imprisoned and then released by the CPC, ended up as de facto representative of the Uyghur people? Kadeer was called to play a role, and she plays it just fine. It is a role that has been written by the CPC, and by the Western media, and by the audiences and by the American NED , who is funding her. The story was written long before she arrived, a well proven plot that works with the public and will make everyone happy. It is all over again the Dalai Lama saga, and thanks to the copy-paste now the scriptwriters can relax and enjoy their Summer holidays.

Except, of course, that Rebiya Kadeer is no Dalai Lama, and neither her deeds nor her standing among the Uyghur justifiy any such comparison.

The Important Question

And now down to what many consider the crucial question: is Kadeer in contact or even financing the extremist groups who arranged the killings, or is she, as I suspect, totally ignorant of the reality on the ground? I don't think we will ever find out. It is difficult to believe that the NED, funded by the American Congress, would sponsor anyone connected with terrorism; but if by mistake they did, I am sure they will take good care to hide all the proofs.

Note that, either way, the NED doesn't come out very well from this story. Sponsoring an opportunist who jumps at the chance to get a name for herself while she coldly observes the killings of dozens is hardly in line with the objectives of a National Endowment for Democracy.

But really, is all this so important? 我不认为如此。 Kadeer will not last, and whether she is guilty or not, the peanuts that the NED pays her do not really change anything. Kadeer with her accommodated expatriate Uyghurs of the WUC cannot possibly control the operations of a terrorist group on the ground. And, as an inspirational role, I doubt it very much that she – a woman, twice married, business and PC background – could ever work for young islamist radicals. She will most certainly not turn into the new bin Laden.

No, the real questions for China and for the World are others:

W ho was really behind the killings of 5th July? How will the prisoners be judged? How are the interethnic policies of the CPC failing? How is this failure feeding the bases of some violent groups? What is the connection of these groups with islamist terrorism and what is the probability of Al-Qaeda joining the party? And why is China the only Security Council country that hasn't received a large-scale attack from islamists, in spite of the years-long Uyghur conflict?

And finally, where are the people that are supposed to be answering all these questions?

*See my comment below for the basis of this number.

我有点不愿意读“中国神”。 I never had much of a taste for the mystical, and the rows of whiskered statues staring in the temples fail to arouse in me more than a cautious curiosity. But when I received the latest publications of Blacksmith, the promise of a book that “makes sense” of China's religions caught my eye, and I thought perhaps this was my chance to jump into it and cover a gap in my education.

You might be familiar by now with Blacksmith books of Hong Kong – the same Blacksmith that did the Asian edition of Apologies and other gems like King Hui and Business Republic . I am, and I have come to expect good surprises from them; many things can be said of their books, but surely not “hackneyed” or “banal”. Pete Spurrier , the man behind the company, is not afraid to go with first-time authors, and he seems to have a knack to find intriguing writers with original points of view. Jonathan Chamberlain is perhaps his best find.

Indeed, in terms of surprises, this book delivers from the preface. First, you discover it was actually written and self-published by Chamberlain 30 years ago, inspired by a series of painted glass figures he collected from local markets. It goes on to describe an unusual interview in Bangkok with British mystical writer John Blofeld, a reference in Asian religions, who agreed to give the book a prologue in articulo mortis . And then suddenly, before you realize it, you are swimming in the thick soup of China's beliefs, following the author in his daring quest to make sense of all the Gods. Click to continue »

Wow, there's been some activity around here this week. It is exhausting to be in the limelight, and I long to get back my status of internet chopped liver.

But no worries, I think I know just how to do that:

Make up your mind: N.1 or N.2?

Everybody knows that serious China bloggers don't do Chinglish . That's for newbies, and we are past the “mamma, look what I got” stage. But before you leave, take a look at this a pic I took yesterday on my way to Ningbo . It is now part of my new classified collection of Signology. And there's more here than meets the eye. Click to continue »

Barely two weeks after the publication of the Chrter 08, it has already become old news, lost in the indifference of Western media (with notable exceptions ), and erased in China by the cold intervention of the censors. I want to examine here the importance of this document and give some more thought to it and its possible impact.

There is one line in Chrter 08 which concentrates in my understanding the essence of the document:

“Human Rights are not bestowed by a State. Every person is born with inherent rights to Dignity and Freedom. The government exists for the protection of the Human Rights of its citizens.”

This principle, inspired in the long tradition of the Enlightment and the famous 18 ^th century Declarations, is at the heart of the matter. Should these rights apply to China, or are they just an interference of foreign ideas in Chinese affairs? This mostly unspoken debate that rages today in China is putting in doubt the universality of Human Rights, and questioning it in view of the singularities of the Chinese culture.

Of course, this line of argument does not resist the minimum intellectual scrutiny, but it's marketable to avid patriots. One doesn't need to put many brain cells in contact to see that the entire ideology of Maoism -or today's wild capitalism for that matter- are also based on foreign ideas. And that great Ideas, like print and paper, cure to cancer or Human Rights, belong to Humanity.

One of the most influential political thinkers of the Enlightment, who inspired the precursors of this Charter, wrote 3 centuries ago:

“I am a man before being French. For I am necessarily a man, but French only by accident.”

This Charter is up to now the boldest effort in mainland China to speak out for the Universality of Human Rights. Its influence, directly or indirectly, will no doubt be decisive at the time when these questions will have to be seriously debated by the Chinese government. Whether this happens in turbulent 2009 or many years later, China will be in debt with those 303 brave men who dared to stand up for their ideas.

Reflections on the Chrter 08

Before I write these reflections, I want to state my respect for all the authors and supporters of the Charter in China. My points below are not rejecting their fundamental principles, and they should be understood as constructive critic.

1。 The fact of publishing the Charter and obtaining a few thousand signatures in the Mainland is in itself the most important action for Human Rights ever done in China, and it represents a qualitative leap from previous actions which were: 1- Purely reactive, 2- Mostly isolated, 3- Strongly supported by Western actors. This is a serious challenge to the Chinese government, and a very dangerous one for the signers, as it is well known how China reacts to coordinated efforts of this kind.

2。 One important difference from past actions is the positive nature of the movement. The Charter is not merely a reaction or complaint; it is a statement that stands in its own right. Note, however, one important difference between the line quoted above and those in the classic American and French Declarations: this one is formulated in the negative, “Human Rights are not bestowed by a State”. There is still an important element of reaction which will have consequences on the future of the Charter.

3。 A document of this kind should try to seek the maximum consensus in mainland China. This is, in my understanding, the main weakness of the Chrter 08. Going into particular details, such as proposing federalism for Taiwan, or putting in question sacred figures like Deng Xiaoping (by mentioning Tiananmen*) is not working to achieve maximum consensus. Neither is aggressively criticizing Mao's legacy while failing to recognize the important successes of the present regime. These points can be easily utilized by detractors to turn public opinion against the Charter.

4。 Most importantly, from a theoretical point of view, figures like Mao or KMT should have no place in a Charter that wants to unite the Chinese. The recent History of China is an amazing tale of cruel failures and unequaled successes. Events that need to be openly discussed at some point, certainly, and compensation given to the victims. But direct accusations are altogether at a different level and unworthy of sharing the same document with the generous ideals stated in the Charter. These things do not only weaken the Chrter 08 from a practical point of view, but also reduce its soundness as a Universal Statement.

Will Chrter 08 fly into 09

I have written it before in this blog, and I am convinced of this: China has an intelligent government. For each propaganda muncher crying traitor at Liu Xiaobo, there is one thoughtful official that reads the Charter and understands the challenges that his country is facing. The government of China is as skillful to control internal issues as it is unable to control the external image of the country, and it has done an impressive job this time at downplaying and silencing the Charter. The lesson of 1989 is well learnt.

The sad consequence of this is that today the vast majority of the Chinese population has no idea of the existence of the Chrter 08. And I am not only speaking of the masses of peasants. A quick survey among my personal Shanghai friends, all of them with university education and speakers of at least one foreign language, gave discouraging results: Not a single one of them had even heard the term “ lingbaxianzhang ” (Chrter 08) one week after its publication.

It is unlikely that this Charter -or any other Charter for that matter- will in itself spark political change. Its direct impact is limited, and it has probably already run all it had to run. It is not Charters, but Leaders that start revolutions. And when they do, they look back to the works of the intellectuals to give a meaning to their actions. Inevitably, the time will come for political change in China, and Chrter 08 can be the precursor and the basis for future debate.

However, for these changes to happen peacefully they should first reach the largest possible consensus, not only among the intellectuals, but among the people of China. This includes millions of honest middle aged Chinese who still regard Mao as a respectable leader, and who understand that it is him and his followers, with all their faults, that led China from misery and humiliation to the present prosperity.

These people are not criminals or radicals, nor did they consciously cause any suffering to others during Mao's terrible years. They are simple, honest Chinese who lived the time they had to live working quietly for their country. Brainwashed or not, these are today the good people of China. And when the intellectuals draft and sign a charter they should always bear in mind that it is for them that they are fighting.

History shows that there are two ways to change the system in China: the violent revolution way (Mao) and the peaceful consensus way (Deng). I believe that this second way is the one that most Chinese desire for their country, and China has proven in the past that it is capable of taking it successfully.

However, to move the massive inertia of the CPC requires some level of distress, like the one existing prior to 1978. Whether the impact of the crisis in 2009 will be enough to lead to this situation and whether the leaders in China will be willing or brave enough to push the changes, remains to be seen. But 2009 might very well bring the first real opportunity in many years, and this well timed Chrter 08 might still have its word to say in the coming months.

Conclusion and note to censors

I am living in China, where I have always been treated with patience and generosity by the Chinese people. For this I have learnt to love and admire this country. I know my obligations as a guest, and with my work, my life and my writing I try my best to return all that China has given to me.

Therefore, I state here my respect to Chinese of all ideologies. Dear censor, I would much appreciate it if you can continue to afford me the privilege of living in your country, not only physically, but also through my little voice on the internet. Please, do not block my blog.

Finally, my best wishes to Liu Xiaobo and his family in these difficult moments. Lu Xiaobo is the main drafter of the Chrter 08 and at this moment he is still detained by the police. He should be released immediately.

I want to show him all my support here, and give my tiny contribution by spreading his work below.

Happy Christmas.

。

The Principles

These are the noble principles that 303 brave men published in China in 2008:

Freedom . Freedom is at the core of universal human values. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom in where to live, and the freedoms to strike, to demonstrate, and to protest, among others, are the forms that freedom takes. Without freedom, China will always remain far from civilized ideals.

Human rights. Human rights are not bestowed by a state. Every person is born with inherent rights to dignity and freedom. The government exists for the protection of the human rights of its citizens. The exercise of state power must be authorized by the people. The succession of political disasters in China's recent history is a direct consequence of the ruling regime's disregard for human rights.

Equality. The integrity, dignity, and freedom of every person—regardless of social station, occupation, sex, economic condition, ethnicity, skin color, religion, or political belief—are the same as those of any other. Principles of equality before the law and equality of social, economic, cultural, civil, and political rights must be upheld.

Republicanism. Republicanism, which holds that power should be balanced among different branches of government and competing interests should be served, resembles the traditional Chinese political ideal of “fairness in all under heaven.” It allows different interest groups and social assemblies, and people with a variety of cultures and beliefs, to exercise democratic self-government and to deliberate in order to reach peaceful resolution of public questions on a basis of equal access to government and free and fair competition.

Democracy. The most fundamental principles of democracy are that the people are sovereign and the people select their government. Democracy has these characteristics: (1) Political power begins with the people and the legitimacy of a regime derives from the people. (2) Political power is exercised through choices that the people make. (3) The holders of major official posts in government at all levels are determined through periodic competitive elections. (4) While honoring the will of the majority, the fundamental dignity, freedom, and human rights of minorities are protected. In short, democracy is a modern means for achieving government truly “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”

Constitutional rule. Constitutional rule is rule through a legal system and legal regulations to implement principles that are spelled out in a constitution. It means protecting the freedom and the rights of citizens, limiting and defining the scope of legitimate government power, and providing the administrative apparatus necessary to serve these ends.

*For the mention of Tiananmen incidents and discussion on discrepancies in the Charter, see my previous post here .